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REGENTS PROFESSOR OF THE
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF MARYLAND

M.N.S. Sellers

On October 9,2003, Professor Mortimer Newlin Stead Sellers delivered his first public lecture as Regents Professor of the University System of Maryland (USM). His discourse on The Value and Purpose of
Law took place at the University of Baltimore School of Law, in the
presence of the USM Chancellor, the Regents and the faculty and students of the University of Baltimore School of Law.
The Regents' Professorship was established to recognize one or
more faculty members whose record of scholarly achievement warrants appointment to this highest rank in the University System. Appointment to a Regents' Professorship is made by the chancellor upon
recommendation by one or more of the presidents of the University
System of Maryland institutions. Criteria for appointment include national or international recognition for achievement in the arts, sciences, or the professions.

THE VALUE AND PURPOSE OF LAW
M.N.S. Sellers
OCTOBER 9, 2003
Thank you for that kind introduction and thank you very much for
the invitation to give my first Regents Lecture here, at the University
of Baltimore.
I would like to thank the Regents of the University System of Maryland for the honor that they have done me by linking my name with
theirs. Or I suppose that I should say, because many Regents are here
tonight, thank you Maryland Regents for linking my name with yours.
I am proud to bask in your reflected glory.
I am also proud and grateful to have been a teacher at the University of Baltimore for fourteen years, and very grateful to the colleagues
who have encouraged my research, and particularly to Mebane Turner, Ronald Legon, Gilbert Holmes, Eric Schneider and Michael Meyerson, who suggested and supported my selection as a Regents
professor, and to University of Baltimore President Robert Bogomolny
and University System of Maryland Chancellor William Kirwan who
invited you all here tonight. Thank you.
The two persons that I have worked with most closely over the last
fourteen years have been Donna Frank and Joyce Bauguess. They
have played an enormous role in all of my scholarship and because
this talk is being filmed, I will say to Joyce, who is in the hospital.
Thank you.
Finally, and above all, I think that this is a good moment publicly to
thank my wife, Frances Stead Sellers, and my daughter, Cora Stead
Sellers, who have tolerated and even encouraged my academic
interests.
Greater love hath no woman than to share her house with three
thousand books.
Which brings me to the topic of today's lecture, The Value and Purpose of Law, because the value of law is its service to justice; the value of
justice is its service to society; and the value of society is its service to
human nature, which is to say, in large part, to human affection, or
love-the most important and most useful of the human emotions.
So love is, in this sense, the ultimate basis of law, justice, society, and
peace.
Now, that is a series of very bold and unsubstantiated assertions, and
it is one of the beauties of the nature of twenty-five minute lectures
that they must always consist of a series of bold assertions, which the
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constraints of time liberate from ever having to be substantiated. But I
shall try to elaborate a little bit on what I have just said.
The basis of law is justice because the essential and fundamental
purpose of law is to realize justice, and it is the central and necessary
claim of every legal system that it does so. lt is the nature of law that it
claims to realize justice and the proper purpose of law is to do so. Law
has value only to the extent that law serves justice and law has no value
when it does not.
This will be the central point that I hope to make in this lecture,
which purports to discuss the "value" and the "purpose" of law. The
purpose of law is to realize justice, and law only has value to the extent
that law does so.
lt is the essential nature of legal systems that they claim to be just.
Systems that do not claim to be just are not systems of law. To this I
might add what really are secondary claims in the context of today's
discussion: that justice itself is that set of rules which make it possible
for members of a society to live full and worthwhile lives; and, that
society is that community of human welfare to which all human beings
are drawn by their human capacity for love or affection. Human beings are drawn to construct societies by their desire to associate with
other human beings, because human nature finds its deepest
pleasures in human interactions with other living creatures.
So the ultimate basis of law is love, in the sense that law exists for the
maintenance of human society, but the more immediate purpose of
law is justice, and that will be the focus of my remarks today.
Now, I don't suppose that this last statement will seem particularly
controversial to those of you who are not lawyers. Law ought to be
just, because society ought to be just. People ought to care about the
law, and to respect the law, when the law is systematically just, but not
when the law is systematically unjust. Governments claim that people
ought to obey their laws and, therefore, must also claim that their laws
are just.
Governments claim in their public pronouncements to "establish
justice" through law. This claim is made by the United States Constitution. All governments make this claim whether or not their laws
actually establish justice. Governments always make this claim
whether or not their laws actually establish just institutions. The claim
will always be made that the existing legal system is just, whether or
not it is just, in fact.
This helps to explain why lawyers and even philosophers have so
seldom in the past formulated their definitions and descriptions of
law in terms of the law's claim to justice. Lawyers and philosophers in
the past have not very often formulated their definitions and descriptions of law in terms of the law's claim to justice, because the law is
not, in fact, always just.
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It is possible to say that such-and-such a rule is the law in such-andsuch a jurisdiction, but that it is, in fact, ur~ust. So, for example,
H.L.A. Hart, when he was professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, insisted on the separation of law and morals.} He wanted to
make a firm distinction between what the law is, and what the law
ought to be. 2 Bad laws should be disobeyed, perhaps, but that does
not mean that they are not laws, Hart said, it just means that they do
not deserve our respect and obedience. 3 This is far from being a
novel view.
John Austin, the very influential English legal theorist of the early
nineteenth century, strongly promoted the view that "[t]he existence
of law is one thing, its merit or demerit another."4 Austin described
law as commands,5 by which he meant significations of desire. He
believed that all laws were significations of desire, coupled with the
purpose of inflicting an evil or pain if the desire should be disregarded. 6 For legal positivists such as Austin, laws are commands that
oblige generally to acts or forbearances of a class. 7 Laws are commands issued by a determinate rational being to those subordinate to
him. 8 This way of looking at things makes it very easy to separate law
from morality. Law, according to Austin's theory, is whatever the sovereign in any given state says that it is.
The trouble with looking at law in this way is that it misses the role
of judges and other enforcers of the law. Respect for the law, but even
more than that, respect for judges, has always been a particularly
prominent feature of American culture, so it should not be surprising
that it was an American, John Chipman Gray, who very quickly noticed Austin's weakness in this respect, and reformulated Austin's definition of law.
Gray claimed that the law of the state is composed of those rules
which the courts, which is to say, the judicial organs of the state, "lay
down for the determination of rights and duties."9
In other words, for Gray, the law is not what the legislature or sovereign says that it is, but what the courts say that it is.
Gray's near contemporary, the famous cynic and United States Supreme Court justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes, went one step further.
1. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Marals, in ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, 49 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983).
2. [d. at 71.
3. [d. at 75.
4. [d. at 52.
5. JOHN AUSTIN, Lecture I, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, lOII (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ed. 1999) (1832).
6. [d. at 21.
7. [d. at 29.
8. [d. at 118.
9. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw, 82 (Columbia
Univ. Press, 1909).
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Speaking to a group of idealistic young law students, in a forum much
like this one, at the dedication of a new law building at Boston University. Speaking to sweet young law students in all the nastiness of his
embittered old age, Holmes said that law is not even what the judges
themselves say that it is. Instead, law is what judges actually do in deciding cases. "Law," for Holmes, was "a set of prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact."lo Holmes insisted that "the object of our
study"-he meant the study of law-the object of our study should be
"the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts."ll
Now, John Chipman Gray was largely right about what gets taught
in law schools. An awful lot of time in law schools is spent on studying
what judges have said in the past about what the law is in particular
cases. And Oliver Wendell Holmes was right about what many lawyers
spend much of their time doing. Many lawyers spend much of their
time predicting what courts will actually punish their clients for having done. Holmes called this the "bad man" theory of law. Holmes
looked at law from the perspective of the bad man, who cares only
about what he will be made to suffer for. Lots of lawyers, and their
clients, are "bad men" in the sense that Holmes approved of.
But that is not the purpose of law.
It is not what makes law valuable.
And although it is also at some level true, it does not reach the essential attribute of law, which is its claim to be just.
The examples that I have given so far illustrate three common fallacies about law: the positivist fallacy of law; the interpretivist fallacy of law;
and the realist fallacy of law.
Positivists, such as Austin, think that the content of law can be determined by looking at the determinate intent of determinate legislators.
They think that law is some particular person's determinable expression of how things ought to be done.
But the positivist fallacy is mistaken, because those who promulgate
their will as law also claim that law ought to be obeyed. In other
words, they claim that their will is just, as expressed through law. They
claim that their will is just and, in staking a claim to justice, they must
enlist the interpretive power of judges and other public officials. Law
is not only what they say it is, but is also supposedly just; and this claim
of justice colors the interpretation and application of supposedly positive legal norms.
Seeing this to be true, one might fall into the interpretivist fallacy of
law, which is to believe that the law emerges and becomes determinate
10. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
(1897).

11. Id.

HARV.

L. REv. 457
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only through the application by judges and others of positive sources
of law (such as legislation) to actual cases and controversies.
But interpretivists also go too far on the strength of their one important insight, because judges and the police can still be mistaken.
When legislators or a constitution charge judges or the police with a
certain amount of discretion, by using moral words such as "liberty" or
"reasonable" in statutes, for example, judges may still interpret these
statutes wrongly, or corruptly. Not all interpretations are correct, or
even prima facie acceptable. Some interpretations of the law can be
seen to be wrong, even when they are made by courts, and enforced
by the state.
The realist might say that even if some judicial decisions are wrong,
wrong decisions are law, if they are enforced. But here too realists will
get into trouble, because in order to predict what courts will do, and
which decisions the state will enforce, lawyers will have to take into
account the formal sources and the moral pretensions of law. Law
may be (at some level) whatever the courts will do, but what courts will
do depends on the legal system that they belong to, and judges in all
legal systems will be directed in part by their system's claim of
legitimacy.
Judges and other officers of the law will be guided by the moral
directives of their legal system's claim to be just.
Which brings me to the final fallacy about law that I want to criticize
today, and then I will finish by returning to my own-let us call this
the "correct"-view about the value and purpose of law.
The final fallacy that I want to identify this evening is the naturalist
fallacy of law, which identifies the law with justice. The naturalist fallacy assumes that everything which ought to be law is the law in fact. I
have never actually met anybody who really believed this. But I think
that it is worth bringing up the naturalist fallacy to distinguish it from
what I am saying myself.
The naturalist fallacy assumes that everything which ought to be the
law, is the law in fact.
What I am saying, in company, I think, with every legal system that
the world has ever known, is not that what ought to be the law is already the law, without any mediation by the legal system itself. The
concept of law that I am articulating here begins with the universal
and, indeed, the tautologous position that what ought to be the law,
ought to be the law. I am saying that the value and purpose of all legal
systems is to make what ought to be the law, the law in fact.
Laws only exist in the context of the legal systems that create them,
and all legal systems claim to be just. All legal systems claim the virtue
of maintaining a process through which what ought to be the law becomes the law in fact. It is on the basis of this assertion of moral correctness that legal systems make the further claim that their subjects
ought to obey them. And indeed it is true that the subjects of a legal
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system would have a duty to obey its laws in most circumstances, if it
were in fact also true that the legal system answered questions of what
ought to be the law, better than its subjects would by using some other
system.
The value of all legal systems is epistemic, if they have any value at all.
Legal systems properly exist for the purpose of giving right answers
about justice.
This observation has two important implications: first, the less effective a legal system is in doing this-which is to say, the less effective
that a legal system is in giving right answers about justice-the less
attention or obedience that legal system deserves; and second, in order to capture attention and obedience, legal systems will try to appear
to be just, or even actually try to be just in some aspects of their rule,
and this will have an influence on judges, the police, and other officers of the law.
So all legal systems contain a certain amount of moral language,
which requires interpretation and opens a gap between the law itself
and the original intentions or understandings of the persons who
framed it.
If the value and purpose oflaw lies in the realization of justice, then
the legitimacy of all legal systems will depend on their actual ability to
realize justice, in fact.
The legitimacy of all legal systems depends upon their actual ability
to realize justice in a particular society, and this separates the study of
justice from the study of law.
Justice derives, as I have asserted, from the rules that should govern
a human society, so that all its members can live worthwhile and fulfilling lives.
Law begins somewhat differently with the political institutions that
discover and implement these rules of justice best. What such institutions discover and implement is the law, even when it is not fully just.
One may have, and in fact I do have, quite an elaborate theory of
justice-and I have hinted already this evening about what my theory
of justice is-but the more important question for the actual implementation of justice, which is to say for law, is how to adjudicate between my particular conception of justice and somebody else's.
Law is a theory of practical justice, and a legal system is a process for
discovering and implementing the rules that justice requires.
Lawyers and others should look at the law in this way for two reasons: first, because it is in fact the way that most people do look at the
law, as a system that ought to implement justice. All legal systems
claim to do so; and second, because the less effective any legal system is
in realizing justice, the less it deserves anyone's attention or
obedience.
The purpose of law is to realize justice.
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Law's value depends upon doing so well.
Our duty as lawyers, law professors, judges and citizens is to measure the law against the purpose for which law exists, and to strive to
help the law to serve this purpose better.

